Bajjio писал(а):Возымело. Закрыто к сожалению. Наземные установки с-300 в спящем режиме, их не видно без излучения подсветки, подсвет целей - самолеты радиолокационной поддержка НАТО над Европой (в основном, польша). Авиация работает только в прифронтовой зоне на малых высотах.
Чушь это журналистская про "бесполётную зону", это только если работа истребительной авиации постоянная, и то её возможности ограничены аэродромами/запасом горючего/численностью. Высоко эшелонированная ПВО это очень громоздкая и сложная история, у всех армий. Шведские военные ниже описали реальность для С-400. Для высокоманевренной цели типа истребителя у него те же 20-35 км, что и у С-300, и кто из них успешнее отработает, истребитель вынесет РПН противорадиолокационной ракетой, сделав бесполезными пусковые, или какая-то из пусковых всё же вынесет истребитель, никто не знает, так как стрельбы на полигоне велись по громоздкому высоко идущему самолёту-мишени, а не по низколетящему камикадзе на реальном истребителе. Реальный же массовый налёт на батарею дронов, истребителей, ракет, не отрабатывался на практике никогда. Ну и какова при этом нужна будет частота размещения пусковых с радарами чтобы закрыть реально большую площадь. Никаких ресурсов на это не хватит.
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The S-400 is a heavy but mobile SAM system, known as Triumf in Russia and the SA-21 Growler by NATO. It is marketed as being close to omnipotent against almost all kinds of flying targets, from ballistic missiles and strategic aircraft, to stealth aircraft, cruise missiles and precision guided munitions (PGMs). In reality, the system is probably optimized for the interception of ballistic missiles and large high-value aircraft at high altitudes, with an ancillary function against smaller targets at lower altitudes.
The S-400 system is meant to utilize different kinds of missiles, which differ in speed, range and guidance, much like the US Patriot system can use different missiles for different targets and purposes:
- a large, very long-range (400 km) high-speed missile with active radar guidance, known as the 40N6, is intended primarily for use against large high-value targets. This missile is the basis for the oft-repeated claim that the S-400 has a range of 400 km, but has repeatedly failed in tests and is not yet in series production or operational. However, Moscow has recently claimed that it has now been cleared for production.
- a large, long-range (200–250 km) high-speed missile with semi-active guidance, known as the 48N6, is probably intended for the same types of targets. This is a slightly enhanced version of the missile used in the older S-300 family of systems, known as SA-10 Grumble and SA-20 Gargoyle by NATO.
- a highly agile short- to medium-range (two versions exist, 40 and 120 km) missile with active radar guidance, known as the 9M96 and 9M96DM, is intended for use against tactical aircraft, PGMs and ballistic missile warheads. This missile is primarily for self-defence of the S-400 units and any Russian high-value targets close to it.
The S-400 is by all accounts a potent air defence system, but is still far from the 400-km range menace to all things flying that it is often made out to be. Since the most potent long-range missile is still not operational, the currently fielded system uses the same long-range semi-active missile as the later versions of the older S-300 system, thus limiting range and performance against all targets but large aircraft at high altitude. Until the 40N6 missile is actually fielded, the main new features of the S-400 system is that its more modern radar is able to handle a greater number of targets simultaneously, and that its agile short- to medium-range active missiles have capabilities against low-flying and maneuvering targets and against incoming PGMs.
However, the comparatively short range of these agile missiles, in combination with the inherent problems of acquiring low-flying objects, limits the effective range of the S-400 against maneuvering targets at low altitude – such as cruise missiles or fighter aircraft. Against such targets its effective range may be as little as 20-35 km, or even less depending on the terrain.
This means – at least until the 40N6 missile becomes operational – that the much-vaunted S-400 far from establishes a ‘no-go-zone’ over the southern Baltic. It should mainly be seen as a threat to tankers, transports, and other large aircraft flying at high to medium altitudes within 200–250 km, and against fighter aircraft or PGMs directly attacking the S-400 battery or objects in its immediate vicinity.
Moreover, if and when the 40N6 missile becomes operational, in order to fully exploit its range against targets between 3000 and 10000 metres altitude, it will be necessary to connect the S-400 battery to an external (airborne or forward- placed) radar that can see the target and provide usable target data for the missile battery. Using an external and forward-placed sensor to provide target data so that a “shooter” (launch unit) positioned further back can fire on a target beyond the horizon is often called a Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). When applied to airborne targets capable of moving in three dimensions at high speed, this is a demanding task involving a lot of high-tech engineering and integration, which the US Navy has only recently mastered after decades of effort. Given the problems in Russia’s defence industries, perhaps particularly defence electronics, it seems unlikely that Russia will be able to do this anytime soon.
Naturally, capable SAM-systems such as the S-400 and S-300 would be a priority target for enemy air forces early on in any war. In the Gulf War of 1991 the US- led coalition air forces wreaked havoc on Iraq’s air defence systems in the first days of the air campaign, using highly effective air-launched missiles that homed in on radar signals. To guard against this threat, S-400 and S-300 batteries are often complemented by short-range air defence systems for point defence. The most modern short-range system in Russian service is the Pantsir S1, known as the SA-22 Greyhound by NATO, which combines 30-mm guns and short-range ground-to-air missiles with radar and optronic fire direction in a single package mounted on a truck. Supposedly powerful and modern, it has nonetheless repeatedly come up short against Israeli F-16s armed with Delilah missiles in Syria.
An S-400 battery only has a single Grave Stone engagement radar. This means that a successful strike on that one unit will render the whole battery, with its four missile launchers and 16–64 ready missiles, useless. If the location of that radar is known, missiles or GPS-guided glide bombs can be launched from a safe distance in order to disable it. It can safely be assumed that the USA, not least the USAFE (US Air Force in Europe), using various means to keep tabs on the whereabouts of these heavy SAM units and on the concrete-reinforced firing positions that have been prepared for them in the region.
Moreover, in a pre-planned operation it is possible to orchestrate a multitude of assets – surveillance, jammers, decoys, long-range missiles, artillery, special forces, stealth assets, and so on – to achieve good effects with acceptable levels of risk. If it is a known high-value target in defended airspace, scarce stealth strike assets (B-2 bombers, F-35s) can be detailed to simply take it out with satellite-guided bombs. As F-35s increasingly come on line in the coming years in US and allied air forces, stealth assets will cease to be an exclusive resource.
While the Russians are very good at operational deception and the use of mock-ups and inflatable decoys, the components of S-300/400 units are large and therefore hard to hide when they are ready for use. In particular, for as long as the 40N6 missile is not operational, the long-range engagement capabilities of S-300 and S-400 batteries are dependent on a single engagement radar to illuminate targets during much of the trajectory. While transmitting, that radar can be easily located – and if that radar is knocked out the battery becomes next to useless.
The short- (9M96) and medium-range (9M96DM) missiles for the S-400-system, however, have active seekers and are thus not dependent on illumination from the ground during the whole flight. But they cannot still be labelled – except at comparatively short ranges – as true fire-and-forget-missiles as they require updates of target-data by data link from the ground station while in flight. If and when the 40N6 missile becomes operational with S-400 batteries, it remains to be assessed how good it is at operating in an active mode. If well-functioning, it might be possible for it to operate in “fire and forget” within perhaps 30-50 km distance from the battery. However, for more distant airborne targets even these missiles will probably depend on updates of the target’s position, course and speed provided from a radar on the ground and conveyed by data link.
Another vulnerability of S-300 and S-400 systems is their capacity to handle multiple targets simultaneously. An S-300 battalion’s target engagement radar is reported to be able to handle 12 targets simultaneously and the battalion has 24 missiles available without reloading. Standard Russian practice is to fire two missiles at each target. This means that an attack of more than 12 incoming missiles or glide bombs is likely to overwhelm the S-300 battalion – what in military jargon is called a saturation attack.
Similarly, an S-400 battery can have 16 long-range missiles ready to fire, or 64 medium-range missiles or a mix of the two. A battalion of S-400 consists of two batteries and thus has twice those numbers. Russian sources claim the S-400 system can handle up to 36 targets simultaneously, but the number of missiles and the doctrine of firing two missiles means that a battalion can handle a maximum of 16 targets at the same time with long-range missiles, or 64 targets if only medium-range missiles have been loaded. However, that two batteries in the same battalion should have loaded up with only medium-range missiles seems unlikely, as that would mean yielding the capability to engage at long range. The large long-range missiles of the S-300 and S-400 systems are heavy and bulky (weighing close to two tons), which means that reloading after a salvo has been fired takes time.
These characteristics would seem to allow an adversary to devise a straight-forward saturation attack consisting of escort jamming, dozens of air-launched precision-guided stand-off weapons, and air-launched decoys. The incoming attack will force the battery to light up its engagement radar and reveal its location. Then, once the readied surface-to-air missiles have been expended on incoming decoys and missiles, taking out the engagement radar should not be too difficult.
Alternatively, an S-300 or S-400 unit could be taken out by long-range rocket artillery or by guided glide bombs delivered by stealth aircraft. This, however, requires reasonably reliable data on the battery’s location, something drones or special forces could contribute to, particularly in the small and accessible Kaliningrad exclave.
Touring* » Сб окт 08, 2022 12:03 am 
не те заведения посещал наверное... Вот где действительно вкусно, так это в Польше
